

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION**

|                                       |   |                                   |
|---------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| <b>PRESTON FAYNE,</b>                 | ) | <b>CASE NO. 1:12 CV 2500</b>      |
|                                       | ) |                                   |
| <b>Plaintiff,</b>                     | ) | <b>JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO</b> |
|                                       | ) |                                   |
| <b>v.</b>                             | ) |                                   |
|                                       | ) | <b><u>OPINION AND ORDER</u></b>   |
| <b>WARDEN CLIPPER, <i>et al.</i>,</b> | ) |                                   |
|                                       | ) |                                   |
| <b>Defendants.</b>                    | ) |                                   |

**CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:**

*Pro se* Plaintiff Preston Fayne filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lorain Correctional Institution (“LORCI”) Warden Ms. Clipper and Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) Director Gary C. Mohr. In the Complaint, Plaintiff challenges the ODRC policy requiring family members and friends desiring to send money to an inmate to do so through a company called JPAY. He seeks injunctive relief.

**I. BACKGROUND**

Plaintiff objects to the new ODRC policy requiring all money orders for inmates to be sent through the Florida company, JPAY. Prior to the initiation of the new policy on October 3, 2012, money orders intended for prisoners were sent directly to the institution. Plaintiff claims JPAY assesses service fees of \$1.50 for every \$20.00 sent to an inmate. The fees are deducted

from the amount of the money order, thereby reducing the amount of funds available to the inmate. Moreover, the company requires all incoming money orders to be accompanied by a copy of the sender's identification. Plaintiff indicates his family is uncomfortable with this new policy because they fear it will make them vulnerable to identity theft. He also alleges his family does not have access to a photocopier. He asks this Court to "disallow this arbitrary power move." (Doc. 1 at 6).

## **II. LAW AND ANALYSIS**

### **Standard of Review**

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)(per curiam); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an *in forma pauperis* action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.<sup>1</sup> *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Lawler v. Marshall*, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); *Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville*, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327.

A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks "plausibility in the complaint." *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A

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<sup>1</sup> An *in forma pauperis* claim may be dismissed *sua sponte*, without prior notice to the Plaintiff and without service of process on the Defendant, if the Court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); *Spruytte v. Walters*, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); *Harris v. Johnson*, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); *Brooks v. Seiter*, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. *Bell Atl. Corp.*, 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. *Id.* In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. *Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, unlike state trial courts, they do not have general jurisdiction to review all questions of law. *See Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner*, 549 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir.2008). Instead they have only the authority to decide cases that the Constitution and Congress have empowered them to resolve. *Id.* Consequently, “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377(1994)(internal citation omitted).

Generally speaking, the Constitution and Congress have given federal courts authority to hear a case only when the case raises a federal question or when diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. *Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams*, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Diversity of citizenship does not exist in this case as Plaintiff alleges both he and Defendants are residents of Ohio. *See* 28 U.S.C. §1332; *Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.*, 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999)(stating

that federal courts only entertain jurisdiction of cases based on diversity of citizenship under §1332 if there is complete diversity, i.e. where no Plaintiff is the citizen of the same state as any Defendant). Therefore, if federal jurisdiction exists in this case it must be because the case raises a federal question.

In determining whether a claim arises under federal law, the Court looks only to the “well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint and ignores potential defenses” the Defendants may raise. *Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp.*, 501 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir.2007). Although the well-pleaded-complaint rule focuses on what the Plaintiff alleges, it allows the Court to look past the words of the Complaint to determine whether the allegations ultimately involve a federal question. *Ohio ex rel. Skaggs*, 549 F.3d at 475. In addition to causes of action expressly created by federal law, federal question jurisdiction also reaches ostensible state law claims that: (1) necessarily depend on a substantial and disputed federal issue, (2) are completely preempted by federal law or (3) are truly federal-law claims in disguise. *See Mikulski*, 501 F.3d at 560; *City of Warren v. City of Detroit*, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.2007).

Here, Plaintiff is proceeding *pro se* and *pro se* plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and filings. *Boswell v. Mayer*, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir.1999). Indeed, this standard of liberal construction “requires active interpretation ... to construe a *pro se* petition ‘to encompass any allegation stating federal relief.’” *Haines*, 404 U.S. at 520. Even with that liberal construction, however, Plaintiff failed to properly identify a federal question in this case. Although he utilized a complaint form for a civil rights action filed by a prisoner, he does not identify any constitutional rights which he believes this policy violates, and none is apparent on the face of the Complaint.

Principles requiring generous construction of *pro se* pleadings are not without limits. *See Wells v. Brown*, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. *See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.*, 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. *Beaudett*, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would “require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a *pro se* plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” While the Court carefully examined the Complaint and read it with a critical eye for an active and liberal construction, the Court could find no federal claim upon which relief can be granted.

### **III. CONCLUSION**

Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.<sup>2</sup>

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2013

s/ Christopher A. Boyko  
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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<sup>2</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:

An appeal may not be taken *in forma pauperis* if the trial court certifies that it is not taken in good faith.